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.......... My wish list
Preamble
This
article has been motivated by “Imbalance of Power. India’s
Military Choices in an Era of Strategic Competition with China” ( https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/imbalance-of-power)
and “Do Generals Matter” (https://warontherocks.com/2019/06/do-generals-matter/ ) and War is Changing.
Are We? (https://palepurshankar.blogspot.com/2019/10/war-is-changing-are-we-by-lt-gen-p-r.html)
amongst others. However the real trigger
for these thoughts is a conversation I had with a balanced and thinking military
mind which conveyed to me ”The reasons for our anchorage to inertia needs to be
identified and addressed. Primarily, the Government and Armed Forces are not on
the same page with respect to the threats and challenges. Further, Tri Service
dissonance has resulted in lopsided capability development with no single authority
taking ownership. Then, the intellectual quotient of our Generals needs to be
qualitatively enhanced. The list is endless and shall be a long haul. But a beginning
must be made”.
Introduction
Military Generals have often been accused of fighting
tomorrows war with yesteryear experiences which will never occur in the future.
Hitherto fore, they could get away with it since warfare was evolutionary. One could
relate to the past and project it into the future without missing the woods for
the trees. The much-touted Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) revolutionized
the weapon systems through technology but the battlefield remained confined to Land,
Sea and air. That was the past. Tomorrows technologies are disrupting both the
battlefield and weapon systems. That is why I call it Disruption in Military
Affairs (DMA). The emerging multi domain battlefield is far different from the three-
dimensional battlefield of the past. Flag officers of the yore were experts in
one domain, could understand the other two domains reasonably well and could
operate together in what was commonly known as “Joint Operations”. I sincerely
think that era is over. Today’s flag officers (hereafter called Generals) must
provide leadership in an enlarged battlefield with increasing levels of disruptive
technologies.
When the battlefield itself is changing it is only axiomatic
that Generalship needs to change as per the needs of Multi Domain Operations. However,
in the Indian context, the challenge to all our Generals in green, white and
blue is multifold. They must first, start thinking multidomain. A new operational
paradigm is emerging, and it needs a matching technological skill set. Generals
must ensure the Armed Forces acquire weapons systems for tomorrow through the dysfunctional
machinery of today which has not met even yesterday’s requirement. Lastly, there
is no choice but to indigenize. No one is going to give us the technologies on
the multi domain battlefield. Either we develop it, or we do not have it.
Operational Challenge
The biggest challenge facing our Generals is the necessity to
see tomorrows battle contours. Take the case of the limpet mine attack on oil
tankers in the Gulf and the UAV attacks on ARAMCO oilfields. Surgical,
simultaneous, nonlinear, non-contact, offensive maneuver, op art - all boxes
ticked. Tactical, operational and strategic outcomes were clear. Where is the
scope for widespread Rommelesque tank battles, classic infantry bayonet charges,
airforce eliminating counter air operations or sinking enemy destroyers through
carrier strike groups when there is high degree of nuclear deterrence and economic/resource
interdependence. Additionally, if the adversary is undertaking proxy war or
using cyberspace or info space or the electromagnetic spectrum to get at you the
dilemma is compounded. Examine all our military operations since the last two
decades - Kargil War, surgical strikes of 2016, airstrikes 0f 2019 and Doklam. These
probably represent the high and low end of the spectrum of employment of combat
power in time, space and volume. They clearly indicate that wars we will have
to fight have changed while we were still preparing for the last war. I am not
propagating that you ignore the conventional, but our different colored brass must
smell the coffee. Unless we get our operational idea right, the rest does not
have a meaning.
The days of declared or undeclared “War” are over. We have
entered the age of constant conflict – 24x7x 365. Conflict through multiple
domains - covert or overt – offensive or defensive. “Wars” will be sporadic
eruptions of violence in the conflict continuum. This is playing out. As India
is rising it does not seek global domination or regional status. However, it is
rising in a nuclear environment of a budding superpower on one side and a
perpetually failing state on the other. Both inimical to India, aggressive and in
collusion with each other, using every trick in the trade to stem its tide. Hence,
we need an operational doctrine emanating from sagacious Generals who can think
ahead of the oncoming curve.
Skill Set Challenge
The transition from RMA to DMA will be through a host of new
technologies. Some have emerged and some still evolving. These technologies
applied in Multiple Domains will define the future battlefield environment. Hence
there is a need for our Generals to be up on speed on these subjects. Our
Generals need to understand these wide range of subjects to do two things. One:
to develop capabilities based on these technologies and two: to derive concepts
and apply them on the Multi Domain Battleground. Very often the generalist General
must take a decision on something he has no clue about. Often, he has been
found disastrous in such situations. There is a second order effect. His
Juniors know and relate to these subjects better. When they find that their
opinions being cast aside regularly without logic and cases made by them on
solid technological premises are turned on their heads, a certain level of
disaffection sets in. This enlarges into disrespect for Generals and other
senior officers, which is growing healthier by the day. This transcends into
other fields. The Senior – Junior divide is widening to weaken the leadership
fabric of the Armed Forces. Further the third
order effect is that the technically deficit generalist makes a weak case
through his silence in forums which he should be dominating and guiding. As a result
others (mainly bureaucracy) hijack the agenda and all is naught.
How many times have we heard Generals and officers saying that
they are good fighters? They often proclaim to have spent their careers in CI
ops and recount their numbers / kill-based operational performances with pride.
They also mention that technology is not
their domain and blame others for not developing weapons for them. This is all about weak one-dimensional skill
sets. A CEO from the Defence Industry highlighted the classic case of the procurement
of the basic Infantry Weapon – The Rifle. He pointed out that after seven
decades India has not been able to develop its own Rifle. His question was that
if Infantry Generals who dominate the General
Cadre and have garnered all high posts in the Army cannot develop a basic rifle
for their own Arm- the Infantry, how can they be entrusted with preparing the
Indian Army for the next generation battle with next generation technologies? It
is time for each General irrespective of which hat or lanyard he wears, to be
up to it or out of it. There is very little place to hide. The respective
personnel branches of each Service must do some honest and soul-searching introspection
regarding promotion and growth paths without the bias of lanyards or hats. Otherwise the Government will do it for them one day. There is too much
mediocrity coming to the top based on the Regimental buddy system at the expense
of professionalism. At the end I am clear on one thing – an ignorant below par General
is a national disaster. There might be too many around too soon, I suspect
.
Process vs Outcomes Challenge
A new phenomenon is emerging. The Bureaucracy, the
Researchers and Defence Industry (public and private) are now thanking the
Armed Forces in Public Forums in supporting them in their efforts! I was shocked when I heard this repeatedly. When
did they become the lead actors in the drama called “Conflict”? That too when their
process driven system, constantly short on outcomes, has left the nation quite unprepared
for the challenges it faces. While the “Dogmas of Delhi” remark by our external
affairs ministers defines the challenge the Nation faces, our Macro Military System
is more disjointed than ever. The Indian Military System is facing “Dogmas Beyond
Two Delhis”. Unless our Generals have the ability and courage of conviction to rise
above peripheral issues and think strategically, to develop requisite capacities,
we have a problem. Our military machinery which is a large and significant subset
of the “Delhi Dogma” will not change unless our Generals can change their own Interservice
and Inter Corps “Dogmas” aided and abetted by a very strong and retrograde inhouse
“military bureaucracy”. I respect Fd Marshal Manekshaw not for his operational
ability in conduct of “War” but for his strategic ability to prepare the Nation
and the Armed Forces for “War” rising above all these “Dogmas” and
“Bureaucracies”. He did so by a direct connect with the PM, even by passing the
RM, leave alone the bureaucracy, and giving a clear road map and preparing India
for a successful blitzkrieg the world has never seen before or after. The day
when India can listen to its Generals in the same breadth and is convinced of
their apolitical view, professionalism, pragmatism, ability, knowledge and
vision; that will be the day when the Indian Military Generals will be again respected.
From then on, the rest will be QED.
Indigenization Challenge
As Multi Domain Operations become the accepted norm the need
for technological enhancement will be greater. Having said that I will repeat
what I often say – “Technology owned is cheap and technology bought is costly”.
The days of heady economic growths are over. Even then defense budgets were
contracting. Now a vicious cycle of a contracting defense budget of a contracting
economic growth rate is looming ahead. This cycle will last half a decade at
least. Defense technology required to combat new threats will get to be costlier
to import as time passes. Our contracting defense budget is staring at an expanded
battlefield. Eventually it will be “having less for more”. Unless we indigenize,
we will be up the proverbial gum tree. Indigenization will happen if Armed
Forces lead the show. For that - our Generals need to be knowledgeable about technology,
processes, operations, project management and administration and about putting many
other things together to make indigenization a success. We have models to
follow – Navy in ship building and Artillery in Modernization. Good generalship
revolves around consolidation of what we have and building on it. Is it a tough
ask? It seems to be since we are not learning from our successes and are predicted
to be a top weapons importer for the next decade. Ultimately, I must say that passion and a
degree of singlemindedness must be brought in to achieve tangible indigenization.
Without passion, post retirement goodies
can be realized but indigenization will be a dream.
Conclusion
Multi-Domain Operations are here to stay. Disruption in
Military Affairs is happening. The operational environment is changing fast. Military
Generals must gear up and provide a leadership of a different variety in future
if they must safeguard our country. In the toxic and nuclear environment in
which India finds itself, our military leadership needs greater dynamism. Our Generals,
barring a few, have been far from inspirational in their leadership. That is
because the system which produces these Generals is flawed to a large extent.
Unless each Service introspects, there will be heavy price to pay beyond the “Delhi
Dogma”. Generalship in Multi Domain
Operations needs vision, pragmatism and sagacity to guide a sputtering system
through a great change. This is going to be demanding. Are we up to it?
Postscript Comparison
Analyze the multiple unmanned aerial attacks on the Saudi oilfields
at Khurais and Abuqaiq. It was a swarm attack more than 1000-1500 km away with weaponized
UAVs. They had to be controlled from a Satellite, Aerial Relay or Ground Based
Controllers near the targets. Requires a high degree of training and skill set.
A very sophisticated attack planned by either Houthis or Iran. Both are not great
military powers.
Can we do it? No, we cannot. Not for the next five years. Why?
While we have strong Armed Forces, we do not have armed UAVs of that
capability. All our operational UAVs are
imported whose spares dependence is from abroad! Our efforts to develop
indigenous UAVs have been floundering from one failure to another from the time
I was a Lt Col till I retired as a Lt Gen. We do not have an alternate UAV development
program. We are desperately trying to import Predator type UAVs from USA which
will suck the oxygen out our defense budgets. In the meanwhile, the Army, Navy
and Air Force Generals are having a merry squabble as to who should own the UAV
empire. Of course, not to mention that Army has switched horses’ mid-stream as
to who will manage their UAVs. Make it ten years. Multi Domain Capability –
here I come through the Delhi Dogma.
An article well compiled, in essentials and forecasting the face of futuristic warfare.
ReplyDeleteIt is incumbent upon our top brass to rationalize the defence expenditure on projects of futuristic employment rather than still laying emphasis on tank warfare, for which the essential requirements of maneuverability and surprise may be a major hinderance.
Understanding the futuristic spectrum of warfare by our top level leadership needs no further elaboration. Psychological robustness will only be achieved through constant knowledge update.
Brig KV Shandil, SM
I hope the IAS officers in MOD take the initiative and initiate the necessary measures.
ReplyDeleteAn excellent article with every word worth it's weight in gold I had an opportunity to observe most of the aspects from very close quarters having been a member of the General's team at one point in time. The shallowness of thoughts, vision and actions of senior officers in the highest echelons of decision making is a fall out of our system of General Cadre and the supreme mediocrity at the top.
ReplyDeleteNice blog. Found this while searching through name a company
ReplyDelete