WISHING ALL OF YOU A VERY HAPPY NEW YEAR
The Comment
“Long range
artillery aided with precision can be a suitable complement for air-power and
lack of fighter sqns of the IAF. The precision and low cost should be enough
for us to procure the same. The precision element included in long range
rockets will also moderate the myth of rockets being area weapon with limited
use due to higher collateral damage, especially in times when collateral damage
is frowned upon. Pinaka is a better system than Smerch rockets in its ability
to be upgraded and having latest technologies, more importantly, indigenously
developed. Thus, the need of hour is to go in for long range precise rocket
artillery which can swing across the bandwidth of gun artillery at one end and
complementary to airpower at another thus reducing need of guns for contact
battle and freeing up airpower for air superiority”. This response on my
article ‘Pinaka in Conventional Non-Contact Deterrence’[1] is from an officer who commanded a Smerch Regiment when I was
GOC of the Artillery Division. I think it is brilliant, precise and crisp in
its conception. I will take it forward from there to widen the picture since there
is a bigger problem which needs to be addressed
Row Your Boats – On Your Own
Despite Pakistan’s economic tatters and a Chinese economic
slowdown their militaries are expanding and modernizing, unabated. While our relationship
with both our nuclear neighbors is increasingly adversarial, there is an
increasing collusivity between them. The latest being that China is going to give
236 of the latest 155mm Howitzers to Pakistan[2] . On the domestic front, societal events and
upheavals are forcing our so-called ‘Strategic’ friends and neighbors into a
rethink mode to recalibrate their relationships with us. We need to be prepared
to face international headwinds. Welcome to the world of realpolitik and
increased threats. Be prepared to row our boats by ourselves.
Non-Contact Warfare and Long-Range Precision
The Chinese White Paper on defense[3]
lays tremendous focus on surveillance, firepower, extending ranges and standoff
engagements. The USA has very clearly stated that Long Range Precision Fires[4] is
the highest priority and have funded programs accordingly. They talk of Multi
Domain Operations, Non-Contact Warfare and Standoff. So does our newly
appointed CDS. In recent times he has been speaking of Non-Contact Warfare in
every possible forum. Beyond a point, Non-Contact Warfare involving violence must
be executed by Artillery and Air Force only. That point is where Infantry and
Tank ranges end.
Shrinking Military Budgets
The Deccan Herald report[5] on
reduction of allocation to defense is only a trailer. Have no doubt. Military
budgets will stagnate or shrink in a slowing economy. There is no option but to
modernize with tight budgets[6]. We
are also in an era of disruption and multi domain operations[7]. War
is changing[8] without
doubt and we must change accordingly. That means we need to spend more on new
technologies. Budgets for that must also come from the already shrinking
budgets! The finale is that if one thinks that less will be available for
traditional hardware of conflict, he is bang on target. The noose is
tightening. If you cannot think out of the box, be prepared to die within it.
The Himalayan Requirements
Turn to the Himalayas – our main and future battlefield
as evident from the first thoughts of the COAS. The core capability we need is
well-equipped Infantry to hold ground and devastating fire power to inflict
damage on a sustained basis. Firepower means a strong Air Force and
Artillery - short, medium and long-range fire power with annihilative
capability despite taking a hit. To make firepower count we need to force
multiply it with accurate surveillance and target acquisition capability. This
implies that the arrowhead of our forces whose capabilities must be
strengthened and sharpened revolves around Infantry, Artillery and Airforce[9]. Any imbalance in their synergistic capacities will be at a national cost.
State of Infantry, Air Force and Artillery
Let us examine the Infantry, Air Force and Artillery. Our top-heavy Infantry leadership has failed
to modernize its own Arm – The Infantry. Expecting them to modernize the rest
of the Army is far too much. That is a proven fact now. Infantry Generalship
apart, our Infantrymen are the salt of the earth. They will fight to the last
man- last round if the enemy and his firepower is kept off their backs. To do
that we need a strong Air Force and Artillery which are complimentary to each
other to deter the Chinese as also take them on if needed. Potency of IAF is
plummeting with reducing number of Sqns[10]
even after considering future induction of Rafales and Sukhois and production
of Tejas. Any new RFP for any kind of fighters will have a time loop of 15-20
years. That is our record which cannot be shortened. Things will not improve overnight. In the
meantime, China is busy upgrading airfields and its Air Force, to out match us[11]. Our
Air Power edge is eroding. Our Artillery
is getting to be potent with a plethora of Guns and Missiles set to enter the
fray. It has the potential to plug the loopholes which are palpably appearing
due to the slow pace of Infantry modernization and the decreasing Air Power edge.
‘The need of hour is to go in for
long range precise rocket artillery which can swing across the bandwidth of gun
artillery at one end and be complementary
to airpower at another thus reducing need of guns for contact battle and
freeing up airpower for air superiority’.
Pragmatic Options vs Limited Thinking
Very importantly Artillery is the low-cost option which
can substitute air power to meet our national requirements in these hard-economic
times. Is Artillery being positioned and developed accordingly? NO. We are caught
in a situation where the IAF is unable to think beyond fighters and the Indian
Army is not able to think beyond the Infantry. Individual Service capabilities based
on narrow views have taken precedence over overarching national perspectives. The
requirement of the defense establishment to work for a national perspective has
clearly eluded us. The CDS must bridge this divide. Otherwise we will pay a
heavy price.
Force Division vs Force Multiplication
Increasing range of engagement, having non-contact deterrence
capability, substituting depleting air power with relatively low-cost artillery
demands that we have adequate numbers. In 2008 we visualized a set of numbers
for the Pinaka. When the national scenario demands more numbers, the Indian Army
has reduced them[12]! I have
written about this ‘reverse gear’ phenomenon earlier. Further, efficacy of long-range
Artillery is linked with an inherent capability to seek, locate and destroy targets
in depth. There is an essential link between sensors and shooters. Unless you
have UAVs and Long-Range Guns and Rockets intimately linked and functioning as one,
they cannot substitute Air Force. without UAVs, long range Artillery, beyond
visual range is like the blind ‘Dhritarashtra’ of Mahabharat. Till now that
link were the UAVs which were integral to the Artillery. Recently they were
hived off. All the UAVs are to be handed over to the Army Aviation. The thinking
and emphasis is that UAVs are for surveillance and the Army Aviation is
better suited for it. From dual tasking, we have reduced the UAVs to a single
task situation in one stroke. Not only have we reduced the numbers but have
divided our capability. This is the prime example not of force multiplication
but of force division.
Sensor to Shooter Links- Snapped Like a Twig
Once upon a time the aerial sensor-shooter umbilical was
the erstwhile Air OP. They used to carry out observation duties. They were very
effective and so were the guns. Their success is borne out in all operations. There
was an elan about the Air OP boys who carried out dare devil flying to destroy
enemy. They were in sync with the guns. Many times, they were from or had
affiliation with the regiments with which they were firing. These were both personal
and professional. Ever since Army Aviation has come into being, this
link has snapped like a twig. The Army Aviation with its grandiose imagination
of bring part of air mobile forces drifted away from Artillery. In the
process Artillery lost its cutting-edge over the hill capability of observation,
liaison and communication to direct fire effectively through Aviation. Today, these
are peripheral tasks of Army Aviation and not practiced. The Army Aviation is
still full of glorious plans while effectively being air taxis. The Indian Army,
by denying observation to its Artillery is force dividing itself. It has done
it once before with Helicopters and is doing it again with UAVs. That is a pity
to put it mildly.
Leadership and Generalship
Why is this happening? I ascribe it to poor leadership
and decaying Generalship. I have already
written that Generalship is sorely wanting in our context. Please read my article
‘Generally on Generals[13]’.
An overdose and overemphasis of Counter Insurgency operations
has propelled a crop of less than competent Infantry Officers to the top. Some
of them have risen due to a majoritarianism rather than cerebral and visionary ability.
Largely the Indian Army follows a caste system of promotion in
which “the best might
never reach the top, the worst have a fair chance of becoming top Generals. That
happens often due to regimental affiliations, lanyarded views, old boy grids
and bandwagonism. In my opinion this phenomenon has dropped deeper roots over
the past decade ‘. In turn it has led to the marginalization of the Artillery and Mechanized
Forces and ‘Infantrisation’ of Generals. The current system of ‘General Cadre’
is flawed and heavily biased. I have no problem with Infantry Generals at the
top. The best of them are as good as any and I revere them. However, when the not so good are
promoted to the top it is at the cost of marginalization of the best Artillery,
Mech Forces and Sapper Officers. Further if these lower merit Infantry Officers
who have made the grade through other considerations are endowed with favorable
astrology, date of birth and higher seniority on commissioning, they have become
Army Commanders and Chiefs. The Indian Army leadership gets out of balance. Then,
India must recognize that there is a problem. That is already showing up
operationally in the way Artillery is
being viewed and handled. Look beyond to
pay, perks and status erosion. Look at the break down in jointness and acrimonious
Inter Service views which often surface. Look at the crawling pace of modernization. Look
at the politization of Army leadership [14]. Look at the Social Media
and its views on Generals. Take peer and subordinate views. I will re-quote Bob
Dylan - as did the previous Air Chief – “the answer, my friend is blowing in
the wind”.
A National Relook is Mandated
If the Army
leadership presides over force division either by default or design how can synergy
with IAF or IN develop to get to a national doctrine or game plan going? In
such conditions no amount of budget allocations will suffice since a fool and
his money are soon parted. In any case too much of one thing is bad. The time has
come to seriously relook at the promotion to Higher Ranks in the Army. Maybe a Pro-Rata
system is not a bad option. Choose the
best from each Arm and you will have a balanced composition of professional Generals.
Well there will be many views on this issue and many hackles will be raised.
That is fine. Time to call a spade a spade. When Infantry Generals aspire for a
rifle with two barrels; which does not exist in the world and want Infantry to
man and command strategic missile units instead of Artillery which has developed
and raised them from scratch[15],
I think the nation needs to rethink very seriously on the Generalship ability
of some of them. This is a national issue and not merely an internal issue of
the Army or Air Force or Navy anymore. I also think that the time has now come to
shed the Counter Insurgency orientation of the Army. The boots on the ground
approach which has dominated our thinking needs a serious rethink since the
time has passed for that too. A subtle
change is happening. More on that in my next article.
Happy new year sir..
ReplyDeleteKudos for bringing out the perspective view of armed forces capabilities against the national interest backdrop and the stifling professional social order prevalent in the armed forces burgeoned by the "Eklavya Syndrome" so deep rooted in our mindsets. Firepower has been the decisive battle winning factor for ages. The book ' Gunpowder Empires' lucidly brings out the reasons for the rise of Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal Empires' in the 15 and 16 century based on imaginative use of gunpowder. It also delves deeper on the socio-political impact of this rise and the shape of the world that the new order entailed especially in the Middle East and South Asian region. The short point is that we must understand the larger picture and never miss the proverbial woods. We need to go beyond the call of Guns being the lock and keys of the empire. The Guns gave way to manned Airpower assets and same will give way to unmanned assets. However one thing that will remain constant in this change of vectors is Firepower. We must become firepower agnostic and choose means to apply the same with the most economical and efficient means possible. Instead of resorting to a step forward and two back, by talking of battle groups at operational level and then centralising all resources to weaken the fist at the very outset is a reflection of some ingenuous machinations. Long range precision fires are a must and a decisive factor of winning battles at the physical level, whether it was delivered by the infantryman in form of flame or grenade throwers in past or tank man in contact battle or artillery in middle ages or airforce in recent times, the time has come to become firepower agnostic and not get besotted by the fabled invincibility and impact of a particular arm or service on a dynamic battlefield. Infact, this is the reflection of Ostrich mentality out of sync with the modern day war winning needs. Time to smell the coffee !
ReplyDeleteEvery one should know that Artillery delivers more fire power than the airforce also. May be better to have more air defence than fighters for dog fights. We are still in the middle ages and worldwar concept of attack by the infantry - Arty providing covering fire - and dog fights. The Kargil war was a typical example of the war of the middle ages and worldwars. Why attack at all. Didn't Gen Ridgeway say to use fire power rather than man power. Our generals failed and betrayed their men in asking them to attack peaks and capture them. Couldn't they lay seige for days on end with continuous Arty fire. Even Alexander and the mughals laid seiges. And there was no good reason to not to use airforce. In gist - attack by infantry should be the last resort. Use arty. And just do away with the dog fights and make air defence more potent.
ReplyDelete